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The study of moral emotions (i.e. Schadenfreude and envy) is critical to understand the ecological complexity of everyday inter-
actions between cognitive, affective, and social cognition processes. Most previous studies in this area have used correlational
imaging techniques and framed Schadenfreude and envy as unified and monolithic emotional domains. Here, we profit from a
relevant neurodegeneration model to disentangle the brain regions engaged in three dimensions of Schadenfreude and envy:
deservingness, morality, and legality. We tested a group of patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD),
patients with Alzheimer’s disease, as a contrastive neurodegeneration model, and healthy controls on a novel task highlighting each
of these dimensions in scenarios eliciting Schadenfreude and envy. Compared with the Alzheimer’s disease and control groups,
patients with bvFTD obtained significantly higher scores on all dimensions for both emotions. Correlational analyses revealed an
association between envy and Schadenfreude scores and greater deficits in social cognition, inhibitory control, and behaviour
disturbances in bvFTD patients. Brain anatomy findings (restricted to bvFTD and controls) confirmed the partially dissociable
nature of the moral emotions’ experiences and highlighted the importance of socio-moral brain areas in processing those emotions.
In all subjects, an association emerged between Schadenfreude and the ventral striatum, and between envy and the anterior
cingulate cortex. In addition, the results supported an association between scores for moral and legal transgression and the
morphology of areas implicated in emotional appraisal, including the amygdala and the parahippocampus. By contrast, bvFTD
patients exhibited a negative association between increased Schadenfreude and envy across dimensions and critical regions sup-
porting social-value rewards and social-moral processes (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, angular gyrus and precuneus). Together,
this study provides lesion-based evidence for the multidimensional nature of the emotional experiences of envy and Schadenfreude.
Our results offer new insights into the mechanisms subsuming complex emotions and moral cognition in neurodegeneration.
Moreover, this study presents the exacerbation of envy and Schadenfreude as a new potential hallmark of bvFTD that could
impact in diagnosis and progression.
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3 Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience (LPEN), Institute of Cognitive and Translational Neuroscience
(INCyT), INECO Foundation, Favaloro University, Buenos Aires, Argentina
4 National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina
5 Grupo de Investigación en Cerebro y Cognición Social, Bogotá, Colombia
6 Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia
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Introduction
The emerging cognitive neuroscience of moral emotions,
such as Schadenfreude (a German word implying pleasure
for others’ misfortunes) and envy (Takahashi et al., 2009;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014) have opened a window
for comprehending ecological affective processes
(Fontenelle et al., 2015). So far, this field has mainly
relied on correlational imaging studies, largely neglecting
the contributions of the lesion model approach, which
helps to reveal direct links between brain regions and
fine-grained cognitive functions. Active tasks in neuroima-
ging and electromagnetic studies provide only indirect
evidence of brain-behaviour associations (Linden, 2012).
The lesion model (Rorden and Karnath, 2004; Shahid
et al., 2017) and, in particular, the neurodegenerative
lesion model (Irish et al., 2012; Garcı́a-Cordero et al.,
2016; Melloni et al., 2016; O’Callaghan et al., 2016;
Ibanez et al., 2017), reveals the critical areas, which directly
relate to performance in a specific domain. Here we profit
from this methodological strategy to shed new light on the
neural correlates of both emotion types and their key
dimensions.
Emotions constitute an adaptive mechanism supporting
the regulation of one’s own acts and the assessment of
others’ behaviours (Haidt, 2003; Adolfi et al., 2016).
Moral emotions, in particular, seem to be mediated by
culturally defined conventions that are critical for group
organization and cohesiveness (Haidt, 2003; Tangney
et al., 2007). Contrary to basic emotions, these are linked
to the welfare of social groups (Moll et al., 2003; Moll and
de Oliveira-Souza, 2007), as they encourage or inhibit be-
haviours depending on their social acceptability (Ortony
et al., 1990). Moral emotions seem to modulate how
humans assess which behaviours are social and morally
acceptable. According to Haidt (2003), moral emotions
are shaped under the influence of two factors: elicitors
and action tendencies. Elicitors range from the behaviour
of others to events affecting them and their evaluations of
own actions. As regards social action tendencies, moral
emotions are experienced when we are motivated to
deploy other-targeted actions, modulating social order
and welfare. For Haidt (2003), envy and Schadenfreude
appear to integrate another category as they involve no
pro-social action tendencies (Haidt, 2003). Similar to the
self-conscious family of emotions, which arise from a dis-
crepancy between one’s ideal self and current self (Ortony
et al., 1990), Schadenfreude and envy imply a discrepancy
between one’s current status and the status of another
person (Ortony et al., 1990). Thus, social comparison is
crucial for describing all types of moral emotions. New
approaches in the study of moral emotions have described
Schadenfreude and envy as counter-empathy (Cikara and
Fiske, 2013) or fortune of others’ emotions (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2014).
Schadenfreude (to gloat), refers to the perceiver’s experi-
ence of pleasure at another’s misfortune (van Dijk et al.,
2006; Dvash et al., 2010b; Jankowski and Takahashi,
2014). Envy, on the other hand, is defined as displeasure
associated with another’s success. These emotions have
been shown to involve a critical interplay between social,
moral, and affective processes (Takahashi et al., 2009;
Dvash et al., 2010b; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014),
highlighting the complexity of their organization. At the
neuroanatomical level, Schadenfreude has been associated
with activity in ventral striatum, as assessed with functional
MRI (Takahashi et al., 2009; Cikara and Fiske, 2013;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). By contrast, envy has
been associated with activation of temporal regions as
well as the anterior and medial cingulate cortices (ACC
and MCC, respectively) (Takahashi et al., 2009; Cikara
and Fiske, 2013; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014).
Despite the above advances, the literature on moral emo-
tions still faces two caveats: the assumption of monolithic
conceptions of the constructs and the lack of lesion studies
to address the issue.
First, Schadenfreude and envy are most often treated as
monolithic phenomena (van Dijk et al., 2006; Takahashi
et al., 2009). However, research on various other emotion
types have revealed partially dissociable dimensions
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(Portmann, 2000; Chester et al., 2013). Indeed,
Schadenfreude or envy can be differently triggered by a
broad spectrum of behaviours and affective scenarios
(Portmann, 2000). Previous studies have shown that envy
and Schadenfreude have different modulators, including (i)
the inferred desirability of an outcome for a target (Haidt,
2003; Tangney et al., 2007; Takahashi et al., 2009;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014); (ii) target likeability
(Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007; Takahashi et al.,
2009; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014); (iii) inferred
target deservedness (Feather and Sherman, 2002; van Dijk
et al., 2005; Smith and Kim, 2007; Dvash et al., 2010a;
Chester et al., 2013; Ben-Ze’ev, 2014; van Dijk and
Ouwerkerk, 2014; Zaki et al., 2015); and (iv) subject’s
perception of justice and fairness in others’ outcomes
(Feather and Sherman, 2002; Smith, 2009; Dvash et al.,
2010a; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2014; van Dijk and Ouwerkerk, 2014; Yoder and
Decety, 2014; Najle, 2015; Portmann, 2017). The situ-
ations used to trigger envy and Schadenfreude in our
study are in part supported by some of these factors. In
particular, deservingness situations trigger moral emotions
with modulating factors such as target likeability and
inferred target deservedness. In contrast, moral and legal
situations evoke envy and Schadenfreude by modifying
the subjects’ perception of justice and fairness in outcomes
reached by a receptor.
Deservingness, morality, and legality concepts are all
intertwined notions able to modulate experiences of
Schadenfreude (van Dijk and Ouwerkerk, 2014) and envy
(Smith and Kim, 2007; Chester et al., 2013). Considering
that these emotions respond to the disagreement between
one’s current situation and that of another person, different
sources and modulators can be identified for these emo-
tions, including deduced target deservedness (Feather and
Sherman, 2002; van Dijk et al., 2005; Smith and Kim,
2007; Dvash et al., 2010a; Chester et al., 2013; Ben-
Ze’ev, 2014; van Dijk and Ouwerkerk, 2014; Zaki et al.,
2015) and the perception of fairness in others’ outcomes
(Feather and Sherman, 2002; Smith, 2009; Dvash et al.,
2010a; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2014; van Dijk and Ouwerkerk, 2014; Yoder and
Decety, 2014; Najle, 2015; Portmann, 2017). Along these
lines, different approaches ranging from social psychology
(Ortony et al., 1990; Portmann, 2002; Ben-Ze’ev, 2014),
to sociology (Plutchik, 1980; Fiske, 1992) and philosophy
(de Spinoza, 1883) and, more recently, research in the field
of social cognitive neuroscience (van Dijk et al., 2005;
Takahashi et al., 2009; Dvash et al., 2010a; Chester
et al., 2013; Cikara and Fiske, 2013; Fiske and Taylor,
2013), indicate that Schadenfreude and envy are complex
and non-unified emotional experiences modulated by differ-
ent factors, including the interplay between high and low
order affective and cognitive mechanisms (Chester et al.,
2013; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014).
Also, building on Schopenhauer’s (1788–1860) account
of Schadenfreude as a most obscure expression of human
emotionality, this emotion can be considered to possess a
component of maliciousness, even if the outcome is
deserved. However, Schadenfreude may also rely on no-
tions of justice (van Dijk et al., 2006; Ben-Ze’ev, 2014),
and moral or legal analyses can exonerate the pleasure
experienced in presence of others’ misfortunes. Enjoying
the misfortune of someone who has violated a legal code
or moral norm may be considered as a well-intentioned
emotion, as it would reflect a reaction to fairness (van
Dijk et al., 2006; Ben-Ze’ev, 2014). Although both situ-
ations involve Schadenfreude, they clearly differ in their
affective implications. Likewise, previous studies suggest
that envy can be elicited either when someone gets an
undeserved outcome or when someone is rewarded despite
moral or legal transgressions (Portmann, 2000; Ben-Ze’ev,
2014; van Dijk and Ouwerkerk, 2014).
From a neurobiological perspective, abundant evidence
indicates that morality is not a wholly unified faculty, but
a collection of dissociable neurocognitive processes depend-
ing on the type of transgression being judged (Parkinson
et al., 2011; Hayashi et al., 2014; Sinnott-Armstrong,
2016). Although different moral situations can share
some neurocognitive mechanisms, they also exhibit dissoci-
able neural pathways. For instance, processing of different
moral situations, including disgust and moral transgres-
sions, share neurocognitive processes as all of them are
related to activity of the ACC, the medial prefrontal
cortex, and the temporoparietal junction. However, these
situations also have dissociable neural activations, as moral
transgressions are more related to activity of the amygdala
and the parahippocampus, whereas disgust is more asso-
ciated to the activity of the posterior cingulate cortex and
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Parkinson et al., 2011;
Hayashi et al., 2014; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2016). Our study
aims to delve deeper into perspective by analysing the emo-
tional responses associated with envy and Schadenfreude as
dissociable experiences rather than as unified, monolithic
constructs. We use the term ‘monolithic’ to refer to differ-
ent situations than can elicit a same emotional response.
For instance, although all dimensions of moral emotions
can elicit pleasure or displeasure, each of them is typical
of different situations (moral, legal or deservedness). This
approach could offer new options in the study of envy and
Schadenfreude by providing evidence on how they can be
modulated by situations that differ in their nature.
Thus, at least three distinct dimensions of Schadenfreude
and envy can be identified as more or less prominent
depending on the situation: deservingness (the degree to
which an actor deserves the outcome he experienced), mor-
ality (the degree to which an actor gets a different outcome
than he/she could expected involving a moral precept vio-
lation), and legality (the degree to which an actor gets a
different outcome than he/she could expected involving a
legal precept violation). While each of these dimensions
involves different cognitive and affective foundations and
may thus rely on partially different neural mechanisms,
such fine-grained associations have not yet been assessed.
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Against this background, we conducted the first lesion-
model study on the correlates of these dimensions for
both Schadenfreude and envy. Specifically, we focused on
the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia
(bvFTD), a relevant neurodegenerative lesion model featur-
ing selective atrophy of the main pathways associated with
envy (the ACC and temporal areas) and Schadenfreude (the
fronto-striatal network). This complex clinical syndrome is
characterized by social cognition deficits and marked be-
havioural changes that impair social interaction (Piguet
et al., 2011; Ibañez and Manes, 2012; Seeley et al., 2012;
Ibanez et al., 2014, 2017). More particularly, bvFTD have
been associated with alterations in social and moral cogni-
tion, including reduced empathic concern for others’ suffer-
ing (Eslinger et al., 2011a; Baez et al., 2014c, 2016b;
Melloni et al., 2014), diminished prosocial sentiments
(Moll et al., 2011), and reduced long-term cooperative be-
haviours (Melloni et al., 2016; Ibanez et al., 2017).
Furthermore, patients with bvFTD show altered moral
judgements, displaying more utilitarian judgements in the
face of moral dilemmas (Baez et al., 2014a, 2016a). A
similar pattern has been also observed in extreme criminal
terrorists (Baez et al., 2017b). Finally, these patients have
been shown to display increased antisocial and criminal
behaviour (de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Liljegren et al.,
2015), as well as a relatively high incidence of legal viola-
tions (Mendez, 2010). In sum, bvFTD offers a relevant
lesion model to assess the specific neural correlates of the
different dimensions operative in the experience of
Schadenfreude and envy.
To this end, we created a novel task tapping the dimen-
sions of deservingness, morality, and legality in moral emo-
tions, and administered it to patients with bvFTD, matched
healthy controls, and patients with early stage Alzheimer’s
disease—another form of dementia offering a contrastive
neurodegenerative model. Our task features situations
whose characters are involved in fortunate and unfortunate
events evoking envy and Schadenfreude, respectively.
Crucially, each emotion type involved a subset of scenarios
dominated by feelings of deservingness, morality, or legal-
ity. In addition, neutral situations were added to test task
comprehension and attentional engagement.
We propose two sets of hypotheses at behavioural and
neurocognitive levels. First, we expected a specific pattern
of responses regarding the dimensions of moral emotions.
Previous studies have shown that situations where justice
notions are disrupted (and which feature severe violations
of social codes) involve increased discomfort and heigh-
tened emotional responses (Tangney et al., 2007; Yoder
and Decety, 2014). Thus, for Schadenfreude and envy,
healthy controls can be expected to show more emotional
responses in situations with prominent moral and legal
components compared to deservingness situations. Second,
given that patients with bvFTD present disruptions of
social skills, moral cognition, disinhibited behaviours, and
altered affective states, they were expected to experience
exacerbated degrees of envy and Schadenfreude relative to
the other two groups. Also, since these patients usually
exhibit low sensitivity to follow moral and legal codes
(Mendez et al., 2005; Mendez, 2010; Baez et al., 2014a,
2016a), and usually present counter-empathy behaviours
(Moll et al., 2011), we expected bvFTD patients to exhibit
higher scores across all dimensions (deservingness, moral or
legal) in both emotion types. Thus, in those patients, a
general (non-selective) increase of emotional responses can
be predicted, irrespective of whether they are elicited by
deservingness or moral-legal scenarios. Regarding neuro-
anatomy (assessed with voxel-based morphometry, VBM),
we expected to find differential pathways implicated in
Schadenfreude (striatum) and envy (ACC). In bvFTD pa-
tients, atrophy of frontotemporal regions subserving social
cognition, cognitive control, and behavioural regulation
(Ibañez and Manes, 2012; Seeley et al., 2012; Sedeno
et al., 2017) should be associated with enhanced experi-
ences of both emotion types. Furthermore, atrophy of re-
gions involved in judging third-party and personal moral
and legal situations (Buckholtz et al., 2008), such as the
ACC and angular gyrus, which are impaired in bvFTD and
associated with moral deficits and illegal behaviour in this
condition (Mendez, 2010; Baez et al., 2016b), should also
be associated with envy.
Materials and methods
Participants
We recruited 64 participants from an ongoing protocol (Couto
et al., 2013; Baez et al., 2014c, 2016a, 2017c; Garcı́a-Cordero
et al., 2016; Melloni et al., 2016; Santamaria-Garcia et al.,
2016; Sedeno et al., 2016), namely, 20 patients that met
revised criteria for probable bvFTD (Rascovsky et al., 2011),
24 patients diagnosed with early onset Alzheimer’s disease
(McKhann et al., 2011), and 20 healthy control subjects. All
patients were assessed by a multidisciplinary group of experts,
including two neurologists (A.L., C.H.C.), three psychiatrists
(J.M.S., G.O., H.S.), and two geriatricians (J.F.M., S.H.).
Groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, gender,
or years of education (Table 1). Patients and controls were
included if they had no history of major neurological or psy-
chiatric illnesses (other than bvFTD or Alzheimer’s disease, in
the case of patients) or alcohol/drug abuse. Patients and
healthy controls were included in the study if they had no
general language deficits, including semantic and comprehen-
sion alterations (see additional test below). All participants
provided written informed consent in agreement with the
Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the
Institution’s Ethics and Research Committee.
Neuropsychological tests
General cognitive state
Participants’ general cognitive state was assessed with the
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) (Nasreddine et al.,
2005), and their executive skills were evaluated with a frontal
battery including the INECO Frontal Screening (IFS) test
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(Torralva et al., 2009). The IFS is a 30-point scale that has
been shown to successfully detect executive dysfunction in pa-
tients with neurological and psychiatric diseases (Torralva
et al., 2009; Baez et al., 2014b). This test includes the follow-
ing eight subtests: (i) motor programming (Luria series, ‘fist,
edge, palm’); (ii) conflicting instructions (hitting the table once
when the administrator hits it twice, or hitting it twice when
the administrator hits it only once); (iii) motor inhibitory
control; (iv) numerical working memory (backward digit
span); (v) verbal working memory (months backwards);
(vi) spatial working memory (modified Corsi tapping test);
(vii) abstraction capacity (inferring the meaning of proverbs);
and (viii) verbal inhibitory control (modified Hayling test).
As a complementary measure of inhibitory control, we used
the complete version of the Hayling test (Perez-Perez et al.,
2016). This scale tracks response initiation and response sup-
pression (Hornberger et al., 2010; Perez-Perez et al., 2016) and
has been largely used to assess disinhibition in patients with
neurodegenerative diseases (Torralva et al., 2009; Hornberger
et al., 2010). Higher scores on the Hayling test are thought to
reflect difficulties in inhibitory control (Torralva et al., 2009;
Hornberger et al., 2010).
Neuropsychiatric manifestations, including apathy and disin-
hibition, were assessed with the subjective subscales of apathy,
executive functions, and disinhibition of the Frontal System
Behavioural Scale, which tracks the degree of behavioural
changes since disease onset (Carvalho et al., 2013) and is usu-
ally reported as the percentage of changes of behavioural dis-
turbances between free stages of disease and current stages
(Carvalho et al., 2013; Santamaria-Garcia et al., 2016).
Theory of mind skills were assessed with the Reading the Mind
in the Eyes Test (RMET) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), which is
also sensitive for the assessment of bvFTD and patients with
Alzheimer’s disease (Gregory et al., 2002; Couto et al., 2013;
Baez et al., 2014a). This is a computerized and validated test
consisting of 36 pictures of the eye region of a face.
Participants are asked to choose which of four words best de-
scribes what the person in each photograph is thinking or feeling.
Language assessment
Language subscale in the Montreal Cognitive
Assessment
We analysed the scores in the language subscale from the
MoCA to assess general language performance among the
groups. This subscale has a maximum possible score of 3
points out of a total of 30 in the MoCA. Results of this
task revealed non-significant differences between groups
[F(2,82) = 1.76, P = 0.11]. Mean values of the ratings for this
subscale were 2 [standard deviation (SD) = 0.8] for bvFTD
patients, 2.3 (SD = 0.6) for patients with Alzheimer’s disease,
and 2.6 (SD = 0.4) for healthy controls.
Picture naming task
To rule out semantic deficits, we administered a well-estab-
lished picture-naming task (Snodgrass and Feenan, 1990;
Sanfeliu and Fernandez, 1996) based on 60 black-and-white
pictures depicting three categories of living things (animals,
birds, and fruit) and three categories of artefacts (household
items, tools, and vehicles). Subjects were required to name
with a single spoken word a picture included in an array
of other pictures within a same category. Results of this
task revealed non-significant differences between groups
[F(2,82) = 2.16, P = 0.09]. Mean values of the ratings for pic-
ture naming test in bvFTD group, Alzheimer’s disease group
and healthy controls were 53.7 (SD = 5.6), 56.4 (SD = 4.7),
and 58.8 (SD = 2.8), respectively.






disease (n = 24)
P-value P-value







Age (years) 61.1 (7.98) 58.9 (6.35) 63.1 (5.64) N.S. N.S.
Gender (F:M) 11:9 9:11 13:11 N.S. N.S.
Education (years) 13.32 (4.9) 14.81 (4.3) 13.88 (5.6) N.S. N.S.
Years since disease onset NA 3.1 (2.2) 3.9 (1.9) NA N.S.
MMSE 27.4 (2.1) 21.6 (4.5)** 20.7 (4.8)** 50.01 N.S.
General cognitive assessment
MoCA 26.2 (3.1) 19.2 (6.7)** 22.1 (6.1)** 50.01 N.S.
Total IFS score 24.2 (2.9) 16.9 (5.4) 19.1 (5.9) N.S N.S.
Inhibitory cognitive control measure
Hayling test 9.4 (2.1) 16.4 (2.8) 14.8 (3.1) 50.01 50.05
Behavioural changes
FrSBE (Frontal System Behavioural Scale) total* NA 48.4 (31.1) 37.9 (27.7) NA 50.01
Social cognitive measure
RMET 0.88(0.10) 0.51 (0.16)** 0.69 (0.12)** 50.01 50.05
*To obtain an index of progression of Frontal System Behavioural Scale (FrSBE) scores, we subtracted the present score from the previous score.
**Differences compared to controls.
N.S = differences were not significant; NA = not assessed.
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Experimental task
For the current study we created a novel task based on previ-
ous studies from our own group and others (Takahashi et al.,
2009; Baez et al., 2016c, 2017d). We designed 40 situations to
evoke different types of pleasant (Schadenfreude, n = 15) or
unpleasant (envy, n = 15) emotional experiences, as well as
emotionally neutral scenarios (n = 10) for control purposes.
The situations eliciting each emotion type included five scen-
arios dominated by deservingness, five dominated by morality,
and five dominated by legality. For Schadenfreude, we used
situations that evoke pleasure due to feelings of deservingness
(e.g. a liar is excluded from his or her group of friends), mor-
ality (e.g. a subject is found guilty and punished for faking a
physical disability), and legality (e.g. a subject is punished for
not paying for public transportation). Moreover, we included
five neutral situations (e.g. a person turns on the light in the
house when it gets dark). Likewise, for envy, we created situ-
ations evoking displeasure related to feelings of deservingness
(e.g. a young man got a better test score for being the son of a
professor), morality (e.g. someone avoids waiting at the bank
by simulating a physical disability), and legality (e.g. a polit-
ician takes a vacation using taxpayers’ money). As for
the Schadenfreude situations, we also included five neutral
situations for the envy condition.
Situations associated with each dimension in each type of
emotion were validated through a survey completed by 81
subjects (39 females), with a mean age of 39 years, (SD = 4),
and an average of 12.6 years of education (SD = 2.2). In this
validation study, participants scored a group of deservingness
situations, a group of moral situations, and a group of legal
situations according to their degree of deservedness, morality,
and legality. Results confirmed that each group of situations
effectively tracked the expected dimension for each moral emo-
tion (Schadenfreude and envy). The deservingness situations
obtained the highest deservingness scores, the moral situations
obtained the highest moral content scores, and the legal situ-
ations obtained the highest legality scores (Fig. 1 and
Supplementary material).
In addition, an additional group of 39 extra subjects (details
in the Supplementary material) validated the emotional profile
of the situations of each dimension in each type of emotion
(Schadenfreude and envy). Participants rated deservingness,
moral, and legal situations according to their capacity to
evoke different emotions. Mainly, we assessed the degree in
which situations were able to evoke envy and Schadenfreude
emotions, but also, as a control measure, we assessed to what
extent the situations evoked other socio-moral emotions, such
as pride and guilt. Thus, for Schadenfreude, the participants
were required to score the situations according to how in-
tensely they evoked (i) pleasure; (ii) Schadenfreude (as
Spanish lacks a single word to name this experience, we trans-
lated it as: ‘La satisfacción por lo que le ha ocurrido al sujeto
de la situación’; in English: ‘How much satisfaction do you
feel for the protagonist’s outcome’); and (iii) pride. The
participants also rated the envy situations in terms of how
much these situations evoked (i) displeasure; (ii) envy; and
(iii) guilt. Both pride and guilt emotions were used as control
socio-moral emotions (Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014).
Results confirmed that each group of situations effectively
tracked the expected emotion (Schadenfreude/envy). Although
the situations also evoked other socio-moral emotions, such as
pride/guilt, the scores for those emotions were significantly
lower than for envy/Schadenfreude and for more general emo-
tional responses, namely displeasure/pleasure (Supplementary
material and Supplementary Fig. 1).
Task procedure
First, each participant was shown a real-life photograph and a
description of two target characters matched to the participant
in age and gender (based on data obtained in a brief interview
before the task). The situations for each type of emotion
occurred to the character presented before each block. Based
on the results from the validation study, situations were orga-
nized in two blocks. In the first block (envy), participants
evaluated situations that evoked dimensions of envy and, in
the second block, they evaluated situations that evoked dimen-
sions of Schadenfreude. Envy situations were presented first, in
line with previous evidence suggesting that the degree of envy
predicts Schadenfreude responses (Takahashi et al., 2009;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). In each block, participants
read five situations for each dimension. Within each block,
we also included five situations describing five neutral events
(e.g. a person washes clothes on weekends). Situations in each
block were presented in pseudorandomized order.
Each situation was presented for 3 s. After reading each situ-
ation, participants reported the intensity of their ‘displeasure’
(for the envy block) or ‘pleasure’ (for the Schadenfreude block)
regarding the character’s situation. This stage lasted 3 s
(Fig. 2). All participants provided their responses using 9-
point Likert scales, with 1 meaning ‘low emotional intensity’
and 9 meaning ‘high emotional intensity’. In line with previous
research on empathy and moral processing (Baez et al., 2014a, c,
2016c; Patil and Silani, 2014; Carr et al., 2015), the scales
were always accompanied by simple words indicating low
and high pleasure/unpleasantness, thus minimizing memory-
related confounds while reducing attentional demands and im-
proving comprehension. This procedure has been reported in
multiple neuropsychiatric conditions (Brown and Cohen, 2010;
Ibanez et al., 2012; Baez et al., 2015, 2016a, c), including
neurodegenerative diseases such as bvFTD (Zamboni et al.,
2010; Eslinger et al., 2012; Cohen et al., 2016) and patients
with Alzheimer’s disease (Lai et al., 2008; Tsoucalas et al.,
2015).
In our task, participants were asked to report their
Schadenfreude and envy in terms of pleasure/displeasure
given that these are the main overarching states elicited by
each of those emotions. Previous studies have defined envy
as: ‘an unpleasant, often painful emotion characterized by feel-
ings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an
awareness of a desired attribute by another person or group
of persons’ (van Dijk et al., 2006; Smith and Kim, 2007;
Smith, 2009; Takahashi et al., 2009; Dvash et al., 2010b;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). Also, Schadenfreude has
been formally defined as the pleasure derived from the misfor-
tune of others, involving ‘the expression of pleasure or self-
satisfaction at another’s failure’ (van Dijk et al., 2006; Dvash
et al., 2010b; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). Thus, we have
used the terms ‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ highlighting the crit-
ical emotional responses elicited by specific scenarios of envy
and Schadenfreude. Also, explicit manifestations of envy and
Schadenfreude are socially penalized (van Dijk et al., 2006;
Dvash et al., 2010b; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014) and,
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hence, subjects might report lower levels of these emotions due
to social desirability. Thus, our procedure circumvents such
biases by avoiding explicit questions to explore social situ-
ations and inquiring into pleasure/displeasure, in line with pre-
vious methodological recommendations for exploring social
and affective cognitive processes (Berkman et al., 2014). In
fact, asking about levels of pleasure/displeasure is the standard
procedure reported in previous studies of envy and
Schadenfreude (Takahashi et al., 2009; Baez et al., 2016c,
2017d). We have adopted this design to make our results com-
parable with those of previous relevant literature. Note, also, that
the terms ‘pleasure’ and ‘displeasure’ are easier to understand and
thus more reliable than ‘envy’ and ‘Schadenfreude’ as verbally
cued measures. This is of critical relevance when assessing
patients with such disorders as bvFTD and Alzheimer’s disease.
Task comprehension assessment
Before the emotion task, bvFTD and Alzheimer’s disease patients
performed a pilot study involving situations with positive, nega-
tive, and neutral outcomes affecting a third person. Patients were
asked to determine the type of valence (fortunate versus unfor-
tunate) of each situation, which allowed us to assess general
comprehension of situations while discarding potentially
random response patterns. Relative to neutral situations, positive
and negative situations were assigned higher and lower scores by
both patient samples. These results suggest that patients discri-
minated the emotional valence of each situation type, showing
that their performance was not biased by general comprehension
difficulties (for details, see Supplementary material).
Data analysis
Demographic and cognitive state data were compared among
groups using ANOVA and Tukey’s honest significant differ-
ence post hoc tests. Chi square tests were applied to analyse
categorical variables. Differences between types of emotion
(envy, Schadenfreude, neutral) in each group (bvFTD patients,
Alzheimer’s disease patients, healthy controls) were first ana-
lysed using a 3  3 mixed repeated measures ANOVA. If any
interaction among types of emotion and group was found, a
second level of analysis was implemented for each emotion
separately (Schadenfreude, envy, and neutral) and subse-
quently analysed with a one-way ANOVA using dimension
(deservingness, morality, legality) as the within-subject factor
and group (bvFTD patients, Alzheimer’s disease patients,
healthy controls) as the between-subjects factor. To control
for the effect of general cognitive status on the experimental
tasks, we applied ANCOVA tests independently adjusted for
Figure 1 Scores for deservingness, morality, and legality for each group of situations (deservingness, moral, and legal) of each
moral emotion (envy and Schadenfreude). Situations dominated by deservingness, morality, and legality are identified in green, red, and blue,
respectively. (A) Scores for the Schadenfreude block; (B) scores for the envy block.
Figure 2 General task procedure. The upper panel shows a
trial in the envy block and the bottom panel shows a trial in the
Schadenfreude block. Participants first took part in the envy block
and then performed the Schadenfreude block. In each block, par-
ticipants read five situations (each lasting 3 s) in each dimension
including a group of five neutral situations. In total, participants read
20 situations from each block, which were presented in randomized
order. Next, participants reported the intensity of their ‘displeasure’
(for the envy block) or their ‘pleasure’ (for the Schadenfreude block)
regarding the character’s situation using a 9-point Likert scale with 1
meaning low, and 9 meaning high intensities.
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total scores on the MoCA and the IFS batteries. In addition,
we ran extra analyses controlling results on the experimental
task for inhibitory control and theory of mind measures
(Hayling test and RMET, respectively). As in other reports
of neurodegenerative conditions from our group (Baez et al.,
2014c; Garcı́a-Cordero et al., 2016), we report only those ef-
fects that remained significant following covariation. Tukey’s
HSD post hoc tests were used when appropriate. Effect sizes
were calculated through the partial eta squared (Z2) ratio.
Moreover, correlation analyses were used to explore the rela-
tionship between individual differences in disease presentation
(regarding inhibitory control, theory of mind, and behavioural
changes) and moral emotions (envy and Schadenfreude) in each
group (bvFTD, Alzheimer’s disease, healthy controls). A global
score of envy (mean of deservingness, morality, and legality
dimensions) and a global score of Schadenfreude were created
to facilitate the analysis of the relationship between each moral
emotion and the cognitive-behavioural measures. We also con-
ducted correlational analyses with the scores for each dimension
of both moral emotions.
Imaging recordings and voxel-based
morphometry
Recordings were restricted to bvFTD and healthy control
groups. Structural brain images were obtained using a Philips
Achieva 3 T scanner with a 16-channel SENSE antenna. The
anatomical and 3D T1-weighted images had the following par-
ameters: repetition time = 7.9 ms, echo time = 3.8 ms, ACQ
matrix 220  220 pixels, voxel size 0.5  0.5  0.5 mm, 310
sections. Neuroanatomical correlates were analysed using
VBM (Ashburner and Friston, 2000). Data processing and
analysis were performed with VBM8 on the Statistical
Parametric Mapping 8 package (SPM8; Wellcome Trust
Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm), running under Matlab 2012 (MATLAB and
Statistics Toolbox Release 2012b, The MathWorks, Inc.,
Natick, MA, USA). All imaging analysis steps were conducted
as described in the VBM pipeline (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
john/misc/VBM), as follows. The T1-weighted images were
normalized to the same stereotaxic space generated from the
complete dataset using the DARTEL algorithm, which signifi-
cantly reduces the imprecision of inter-subject recordings. The
images were then segmented into white matter, and grey
matter, and non-brain voxels (CSF). Subsequently, all images
were modulated to correct volume changes by Jacobian deter-
minants. Finally, images were smoothed by convolution
with an isotropic 8-mm full-width Gaussian kernel at half
maximum for statistical analyses.
First, we performed a whole-brain analysis using VBM to
assess differences in brain atrophy between the group of pa-
tients with bvFTD and healthy controls (controlling for global
intracranial volume, age, gender, and length of disease dur-
ation) (Supplementary Fig. 2). The statistical threshold for
whole-brain analysis was defined as P50.001 (extent thresh-
old = 50 voxels). In addition, to investigate potential, the
association between brain areas and moral emotions, we per-
formed a more restrictive analysis using a mask including the
brain regions significantly associated with socio-moral cogni-
tive processes and moral emotions (Schadenfreude and envy)
(Supplementary Fig. 3). Then, using this mask, we performed
multiple regression analyses for each group using topological
false discovery rate (FDR) for correction, at a threshold of
P5 0.05 (Figs 5 and 6). The topological FDR was used fol-
lowing previous studies that suggest that this procedure is
more sensitive than voxel-wise FDR (Chumbley et al., 2010).
In assessing regions of atrophy as predictors of group
performance in the experimental task, and following previous
studies (Couto et al., 2013; Baez et al., 2016a), we restricted
the data’s multidimensionality using an extended mask that
included the brain areas reported to be involved in social-
moral cognition and moral emotions. The group of brain
areas composing the mask was corroborated using
the Neurosynth database (http://www.neurosynth.org). This
meta-analytic database aggregates activation from thousands
of previous functional MRI studies (Yarkoni et al., 2011).
This technique has been used to define main brain areas related
to cognitive processes even in studies using imaging methods,
including VBM (Vendetti and Bunge, 2014; Fermin et al., 2016;
Allen et al., 2017). In Neurosynth online system we introduced
as keywords: ‘moral’ and ‘social cognition’. Afterwards, we
downloaded the mask for both terms and integrated the brain
areas selected in a single unified mask. This mask, following the
Neurosynth database, includes a default correction for brain
multiple comparisons using a FDR criterion of P = 0.01. In add-
ition, we included basal ganglia in this mask considering its role
in processing moral emotions, in particular Shadenfreude
(Takahashi et al., 2009). Furthermore, we also included bilateral
frontal lobe as these brain areas are involved in inhibitory con-
trol (Collette et al., 2001; Nathaniel-James and Frith, 2002;
Roca et al., 2010; Volle et al., 2011) and are related to regula-
tion of moral emotions (Koechlin, 2011; Rudebeck et al., 2013).
Therefore, we used an extended and unified mask including
brain areas derived of two Neurosynth keywords (moral and
social cognition), the basal ganglia, and frontal lobes. The final
unified mask was smoothed with a standard  = 4 mm isotropic
Gaussian kernel (corresponding to full-width at half-max-
imum = 9.4 mm) following a procedure used in previous
studies (Radua et al., 2014; Scarpazza et al., 2015).
In this study we used a mask that includes the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), the cingulate cortex (the anterior and posterior por-
tions), the bilateral insula, the temporal lobes, bilateral angular
gyrus, the superior and medial temporal gyri, the precuneus,
the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the parahippocampus
(socio-moral areas) (Moll et al., 2008; Pievani et al., 2011;
Bzdok et al., 2012; Ibañez and Manes, 2012; Chiong et al.,
2013; Baez et al., 2016a; Santamaria-Garcia et al., 2016;
Sedeno et al., 2016), areas involved in inhibitory control
(in particular the frontal lobe) (Collette et al., 2001;
Nathaniel-James and Frith, 2002; Roca et al., 2010; Eslinger
et al., 2011b; Volle et al., 2011), and regions involved in moral
emotions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and the ven-
tral and dorsal striatum (Takahashi et al., 2009; Dvash et al.,
2010a; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2014; van Dijk and Ouwerkerk, 2014; Baez et al.,
2016c, 2017d) (Supplementary Fig. 3). Considering that the
different dimensions of Schadenfreude and envy (deserving-
ness, moral and legal) could encompass different complex cog-
nitive-affective and social constructs, we also analysed the
brain-behaviour correlations using a whole-brain analysis to
reveal other brain areas involved in processing specific dimen-
sions of moral emotions (Supplementary Fig. 4).
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Brain–behaviour associations
To detect distinctive neurocognitive correlates of moral emotions,
we performed a two-step analysis based on regression models
between moral emotion measures and brain volume. The VBM
regression models were run for of each dimension of moral emo-
tions independently. This procedure was applied to analyse
which brain areas were exclusively associated to each dimension
and which areas exhibited overlap between dimensions. We did
not run all variables together in order to avoid collinearity.
First, both bvFTD patients and controls were included in a
single set (all subjects) to increase behavioural variance and
statistical power (Sollberger et al., 2009; Irish et al., 2014a;
O’Callaghan et al., 2016). This procedure has been also previ-
ously reported in studies exploring the structural correlates of
social cognition in bvFTD (Melloni et al., 2016; Sedeno et al.,
2016). In a second stage, aimed to assess the specific associ-
ation between brain atrophy and potentially abnormal moral
emotion performance, we conducted the same analysis only on
bvFTD patients. Thus, we compared VBM findings first in a
grouped set (all subjects) and later in the bvFTD group only.
This two-step procedure addresses two critical requisites of the
present study. First, as shown by previous studies (Irish et al.,
2012, 2014b; Kumfor et al., 2013; Melloni et al., 2016), the
report of combined results between patients and healthy con-
trols aims to tackle individual differences in VBM analyses
while improving statistical power by increasing sample size,
stability of VBM results, and consistency of the anatomical
correlates of the cognitive measure analysed. Second, the
study of a cognitive measure exclusively in bvFTD allows
exploring which areas are critical for a particular cognitive
process (Rorden and Karnath, 2004; Garcı́a-Cordero et al.,
2016; Melloni et al., 2016; Shahid et al., 2017).
Results
General cognitive state and perfor-
mance on cognitive control, beha-
vioural, and social cognition measures
As expected, bvFTD patients were outperformed by con-
trols on the IFS and the MoCA tests, but they did not differ
significantly from patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Table
1). BvFTD patients also obtained significantly lower scores
than both other groups on the inhibitory control measure
(Hayling B, Table 1). Furthermore, the Frontal System
Behavioural Scale revealed that patients with bvFTD had
significantly greater behavioural impairments than patients
with Alzheimer’s disease (Table 1). Finally, patients with
bvFTD were also significantly more impaired than the
other two groups on a social cognition measure (RMET),
while patients with Alzheimer’s disease performed worse
than healthy controls (Table 1).
Moral emotions
An ANOVA between type of emotion (envy, Schadenfreude,
neutral) and group (bvFTD, Alzheimer’s disease, healthy
controls) revealed a main effect of type of emotion
[F(2,82) = 43.51, P5 0.0001, Z2 = 0.43]. In all groups,
Schadenfreude (P5 0.01) and envy (P5 0.01) situations
were given higher scores than neutral situations. Also, we
observed an interaction of group  type of emotion
[F(4,82) = 13.51, P5 0.001, Z2 = 0.19]. This result
allowed us to perform additional ANOVAs over each
emotion type.
Schadenfreude
The ANOVA showed a main effect of dimension
[F(2,82) = 14.53, P5 0.001, Z2 = 0.13], as deservingness
showed lower scores than morality and legality. In addition
analyses showed an interaction between dimension and
group [F(4,82) = 12.28, P5 0.01, Z2 = 0.22]. Post hoc ana-
lyses (Tukey HSD, mean square = 12.5, df = 2) revealed
higher scores across all three dimensions of
Schadenfreude in bvFTD patients (Fig. 3A) than in patients
with Alzheimer’s disease (deservingness, P = 0.001; moral-
ity, P = 0.03; legality, P = 0.004) and healthy controls
(deservingness, P = 0.04; morality, P = 0.04; legality,
P = 0.05). No differences were observed between patients
with Alzheimer’s disease and healthy controls (deserving-
ness, P = 0.31; morality, P = 0.24; legality, P = 0.12).
Envy
Envy scores were analysed using the same factors reported
above for Schadenfreude. The analyses showed a main effect
of dimension [F(2,82) = 23.53, P5 0.0001, Z2 = 0.39], as
deservingness situations had lower scores than morality
and legality; and an interaction between dimension and
group [F(4,82) = 22.38, P5 0.0001, Z2 = 0.52]. Post hoc
analyses of this last interaction (Tukey HSD, mean
square = 12.5, df = 2) showed that bvFTD patients assigned
higher scores for envy in the legal, moral and deservingness
dimensions (Fig. 3B) than patients with Alzheimer’s disease
(deservingness, P = 0.001; morality, P = 0.03; legality,
P = 0.011) and healthy controls (deservingness, P = 0.05;
morality, P = 0.043; legality, P = 0.031). No differences
were observed on any dimension between patients with
Alzheimer’s disease and healthy controls (deservingness,
P = 0.17; morality, P = 0.31; legality, P = 0.27).
Neutral situations
No significant between-group differences emerged in the
ratings for neutral situations [F(2,82) = 0.89, P = 0.41,
Z2 = 0.001] (Fig. 3C).
Consistency of behavioural results
among groups
Relative to controls, bvFTD and Alzheimer’s disease pa-
tients evinced less consistent (i.e. more varied) scores
across situations in both moral emotions (Supplementary
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material). Nevertheless, no difference emerged between
both patient groups.
Correlation analyses between moral
emotions and cognitive-behavioural
measures
Correlational analyses revealed that in bvFTD patients, the
stronger experience of Schadenfreude (Fig. 4A), the least
inhibitory control (Hayling test, r2 = 0.39, P5 0.05), the
greatest behavioural changes (Frontal System Behavioural
Scale, r2 = 0.44, P5 0.01), and the lowest theory of mind
skills (RMET, r2 = 0.27, P5 0.05). Similarly, higher envy
was associated with reduced inhibitory control (Frontal
System Behavioural Scale, r2 = 0.39, P5 0.05; Fig. 4B)
and theory of mind skills (RMET, r2 = 0.31, P5 0.05).
Correlational analyses for each specific dimension
of Schadenfreude and envy did not reach significance
(all P-values4 0.32). No associations were found in pa-
tients with Alzheimer’s disease (all P-values4 0.24) or
healthy controls (all P-values4 0.31).
Reanalysis of scores on the Schadenfreude, envy, and
neutral situations with cognitive measures as covariates
Group differences in Schadenfreude [F(2,82) = 5.34,
P50.001, Z2 = 0.11] and envy [F(2,82) = 2.28, P5 0.05,
Z2 = 0.07] remained significant after adjusting for MoCA.
Similarly, differences in Schadenfreude [F(2,102) = 2.86,
P5 .05, Z2 = 0.06], and envy [F(2,102) = 3.18, P5 0.05,
Z2 = 0.07] were preserved after covarying for Hayling
scores. Finally, differences between groups in
Schadenfreude [F(1,59)5 7.1, P5 0.01, Z2 = 0.11] and
envy [F(1,59) = 3.46, P5 0.05, Z2 = 0.04] were also
preserved after covarying for RMET scores.
Atrophy in bvFTD patients: VBM
results
Whole-brain analyses comparing the bvFTD group with
healthy controls showed widespread bilateral atrophy pre-
dominantly involving the medial frontal cortex (MFC), the
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the anteromedial temporal
areas, the ACC, the bilateral insula, the basal ganglia, the
right DLPFC, and bilateral medial frontal regions
(P = 0.001, uncorrected) (Supplementary Fig. 1). Atrophy
distribution was consistent with that reported in previous
VBM studies (Rosen et al., 2002; Kipps et al., 2009; Seeley
et al., 2009; Whitwell et al., 2009; Santamaria-Garcia
et al., 2016; Baez et al., 2017c).
Structural neuroimaging of
Schadenfreude and envy
Here we report the regression analyses (P5 0.05, FDR cor-
rected) between each emotion (envy and Schadenfreude) for
each dimension (deservingness, morality, and legality) and
grey matter volume in all subjects (first step) and in bvFTD
patients only (second step).
Figure 3 Dimensions of moral emotions in each group. (A) Schadenfreude results by group. (B) Envy results for each dimension by group.
(C) Results for the neutral condition in each group. The whisker box plot depicts scores of each dimension in each group and the range of
responses (depicted by dots) in each group. Each group was represented by different colours: bvFTD in blue; Alzheimer’s disease (AD) in red,
controls in grey. Asterisks depict significant differences at P5 0.01.
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Figure 4 Correlations between moral emotions and individual bvFTD profiles. (A) Positive correlations between Schadenfreude
scores and behavioural measures (behavioural changes tracked by FrSBE, inhibitory control tracked by the Hayling B test and social cognition
tracked by RMET). (B) The same results are depicted for these behavioural scores and envy. FrSBe = Frontal System Behavioural Scale.
Figure 5 VBM analyses and Schadenfreude dimensions. VBM regression analyses within the brain areas associated with the social
cognition network and moral emotion areas and the scores for each sub-dimension of Schadenfreude. (A) VBM analysis in all subjects. (B) VBM
analysis in bvFTD patients only (in both cases, P5 0.05, FDR corrected).
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The global score for Schadenfreude was positively asso-
ciated with grey matter volume in the bilateral ventral stri-
atum and negatively associated with the volume of the
bilateral angular gyrus. Schadenfreude scores for the
deservingness dimension were positively associated with
grey matter in the dorsal striatum (left caudate and puta-
men) and negatively correlated to bilateral precuneus.
Scores for moral Schadenfreude were negatively associated
with the left angular gyrus and left precuneus. Legal
Schadenfreude scores were negatively associated with bilat-
eral angular gyrus (Fig. 5A and Table 2).
The global score for envy was positively associated with
grey matter volume in the right ACC and with the volume
of the bilateral amygdala and parahippocampus.
Deservingness envy scores were positively associated with
grey matter volume in the right ACC and negatively asso-
ciated with the right DLPFC. In addition, moral and legal
envy were positively associated with grey matter in the
Table 2 Association between grey matter volume and scores for each dimension of Schadenfreude and envy
(FDR corrected at P5 0.05)
Moral emotion by group analyses Brain regions ( + ) () Coordinates x, y, z {mm} Cluster size Peak T
Grouped Schadenfreude
Mean
Bilateral angular gyrus () 51 (54)* 62 23 332 5.65
Right left putamen ( + ) 28 (27)* 6 15 281 5.69
Right left Caudate ( + ) 10 12 14 4 133 5.43
Grouped Schadenfreude
(deservingness dimension)
Bilateral precuneus 7 () 48 9 223 5.49
Right putamen ( + ) 28 6 15 281 5.39
Right caudate ( + ) 10 14 4 133 5.43
Bilateral angular gyrus () 54 64 24 382 5.43
Grouped Schadenfreude
(moral dimension)
Bilateral precuneus () 10 (12)* 14 4 133 5.43
Bilateral angular gyrus () 52 (54)* 64 24 822 6.16
Grouped Schadenfreude
(legal dimension)
Right frontal pole () 46 47 25 236 5.32
BvFTD Schadenfreude
Mean
Bilateral precuneus () 6(6) 63 47 510 5.13
Bilateral angular gyrus () 46 (50)* 64 24 232 5.44
Right DLPFC () 46 39 1 242 5.11
BvFTD Schadenfreude
(deservingness dimension)
Bilateral precuneus () 10 (12) 14 4 222 4.38
BvFTD Schadenfreude
(deservingness dimension)
Right frontal pole () 40 47 25 433 5.76
Bilateral angular gyrus () 50 (48)* 64 24 394 5.23
Right frontal pole () 46 42 2 638 5.33
BvFTD Schadenfreude
(legal dimension)
Bilateral precuneus () 8(6) 48 9 523 5.44
Bilateral angular gyrus () 50 (48)* 64 24 682 5.56
Right ACC ( + ) 2 3 45 457 5.42
Grouped envy
Mean
Bilateral amygdala ( + ) 30 (21)* 6 15 134 5.43
Bilateral hippocampus ( + ) 16 (19) 33 1 101 4.48
Right ACC ( + ) 12 6 45 503 5.77
Grouped envy
(deservingness dimension)
Right DLPFC () 51 39 1 346 5.66
Right ACC ( + ) 11 3 45 468 5.44
Grouped envy
(moral dimension)
Bilateral amygdala ( + ) 22 (24)*6 15 381 5.88
Bilateral hippocampus ( + ) 16 (19) 33 1 103 5.89
Right ACC ( + ) 2 3 45 378 5.24
Grouped envy
(legal dimension)
Precuneus 6 53 30 328 4.32
Bilateral amygdala ( + ) 16 (14)*6 15 317 4.12
Bilateral hippocampus ( + ) 18 (21) 33 1 564 4.09
BvFTD envy
Mean
Bilateral precuneus () 8 (6) 56 39 127 4.57
BvFTD envy
(deservingness dimension)
Right DLPFC () 51 39 1 206 4.16
BvFTD envy
(deservingness dimension)
Bilateral precuneus () 5 (6) 48 9 323 3.94
Bilateral precuneus () 8 6 48 9 447 8.66
BvFTD envy (legal dimension) Right ventromedial prefrontal cortex () 12 (17)*6 15 210 4.43
*Left x-axis coordinates (MNI space).
( + ) Positive associations between moral emotion scores and grey matter volume.
() Negative associations between moral emotion scores and grey matter volume.
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right ACC and with the volume of the bilateral amygdala
and parahippocampus (Fig. 6A and Table 2).
BvFTD patients
An exacerbated experience of Schadenfreude was asso-
ciated with atrophy of the left angular gyrus and and pre-
cuneus. Increased Schadenfreude for the deservingness
dimension was negatively associated with atrophy of the
right DLPFC and the left precuneus. Enhanced moral
Schadenfreude was negatively associated with the bilateral
angular gyrus, and right frontal pole. Legal Schadenfreude
scores were negatively associated with the bilateral angular
gyrus, bilateral precuneus, and right frontal pole (Fig. 5B
and Table 2).
Increased envy was correlated with reduced grey matter
volume in the bilateral precuneus. Scores for the deserving-
ness dimension of envy were negatively associated with
grey matter volume of the right DLPFC. Moral envy
scores were negatively associated with the volume of the
right precuneus. Legal envy was negatively associated with
the volume of the right DLPFC and the right precuneus
(Fig. 6B and Table 2).
The brain–behaviour association in patients with bvFTD
remained similar even using a more general volumetric
analysis (whole-brain analysis, Supplementary Fig. 4).
This analysis revealed negative correlations between
Schadenfreude and envy dimensions and a set of areas
including the precuneus, the angular gyrus, the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, and the frontal pole. In addition, using
this analysis we observed an additional association between
legal scores of Schadenfreude and the left superior parietal
lobe (Brodmann area 7). Furthermore, regarding envy
scores, (global score, moral, and legal dimensions), a posi-
tive association was observed with the bilateral amygdala
and the parahippocampus. Also, other associations were
observed beyond the regions included in the mask.
Schadenfreude was associated with bilateral sensory associ-
ation areas (deservingness, moral, and legal dimensions),
the superior temporal lobe (global score), and the posterior
cingulate cortex (legal dimension). In the same line, envy
Figure 6 VBM analyses and envy. VBM regression analyses within the brain areas associated with the social cognition network and moral
emotion areas and the scores for each sub-dimension of envy. (A) VBM analysis in all subjects. (B) VBM analysis in bvFTD patients only (in both
cases, P5 0.05, FDR corrected).
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was associated with the superior parietal lobe (global
score), the left frontal area (deservingness dimension), sen-
sory association areas (moral and legal dimensions), and
the right supplementary motor area (legal dimension)
(Supplementary Fig. 4 and Supplementary Table 1.
Analysis of envy and Schadenfreude dimensions
controlling by inhibitory control and theory of mind
For mean scores of Schadenfreude, only the association
between the mean scores and atrophy of the precuneus
remain significant after covarying for Hayling test and
RMET scores. The negative association between
Schadenfreude for the deservingness dimension and atrophy
of the precuneus and DLPFC was preserved after control-
ling for such two measures. For moral Schadenfreude, only
the negative association with atrophy of the angular gyrus
survived the correction analyses, as the negative association
with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex disappeared. Legal
Schadenfreude scores remained associated with atrophy of
the precuneus and the angular gyrus. As in the case of
moral Schadenfreude, the negative association with frontal
areas disappeared after covarying for RMET and Hayling
scores (Supplementary Fig. 5 and Supplementary Table 2).
Increased envy remained negatively associated with
reduced grey matter volume in the precuneus after correc-
tion for Hayling and RMET measures. The negative asso-
ciation between DLPFC and deservingness envy was
preserved after covarying with Hayling and RMET
scores. Moral envy scores remained negatively associated
with the volume of the right precuneus after controlling
for Hayling and RMET scores, too. The same was true
for legal envy, although the negative association between
this dimension and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
disappeared after covariation (Supplementary Fig. 5 and
Supplementary Table 2).
Discussion
This study relied on a neurodegenerative lesion model
(bvFTD) to offer the first examination of the neuroanatom-
ical signatures of three key dimensions of Schadenfreude
and envy (deservingness, legality, and morality).
Results supported our behavioural hypothesis. Healthy
controls showed more emotional responses in situations
with prominent moral and legal components compared to
deservingness situations. Similarly, bvFTD patients experi-
enced exacerbated degrees of envy and Schadenfreude rela-
tive to the other two groups. Results also provide support
for the partially differentiated but overlapped dimensions of
moral emotions (Hamann, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012,
2013). These contextual differences in emotional responses
between domains (deservingness, moral and legal) were
supported by several findings. First, although the type of
situations seem to elicit different degrees of emotional
responses, all of them elicit pleasure in the context of
Schadenfreude and displeasure in the context of envy
situations. Second, those situations showed only partially
dissociable brain patterns. Third, they seem to be related
to different cognitive processes, as shown by correlations
between moral emotion scores and scores in the theory of
mind task and the Hayling test.
Regarding the neuroanatomical hypothesis, present re-
sults confirmed the critical role of the striatum in
Schadenfreude and of the ACC in envy, while showing
additional involvement of temporo-parietal regions related
to social and moral cognition processes. Our results also
provide evidence of a convergent pathway for the legal and
moral dimensions, but not for deservingness, which in-
volves parietal regions in the case of Schadenfreude and
anterior temporal regions for envy.
Moral dimensions across groups
Relative to patients with Alzheimer’s disease and healthy
controls, patients with bvFTD had increased scores for all
dimensions of envy and Schadenfreude. Moreover, an
increased experience of Schadenfreude and envy in
bvFTD was associated with alterations in social cognition,
executive functions, and behavioural disturbances reported
in those patients. Specific analyses revealed that the legal
and moral dimensions elicited higher scores than the
deservingness dimension in all groups. These results suggest
that envy and Schadenfreude are multi-dimensional emo-
tions, in agreement with the notion that they can be elicited
by a broad spectrum of social situations, dominated by
feelings of deservingness but also (and especially) by no-
tions of justice linked to moral and legal conventions
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Kipps et al., 2009;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). Judgements of moral
and legal rightness recruit high emotional resources and
require more pacing between cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses (Moll et al., 2003; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza,
2007). Such processes are highly rooted in our cognitive
systems and require special moral assessment, punishment
evaluation, and semantic knowledge of a particular action
(Moll et al., 2003; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007).
Our results are consistent with these previous findings, as
they show enhanced emotional experience for fortunate or
unfortunate situations that occur to other individual in
both the moral and legal dimensions. Interestingly, our re-
sults also show that even in bvFTD patients, who exhibit
various executive, emotional, and socio-cognitive alter-
ations, judgements over morality and legality invoke
higher emotional responses compared to deservingness
(Supplementary material). Given the social and moral
transgression in bvFTD (de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008;
Mendez, 2010; Baez et al., 2014a, 2016a; Liljegren et al.,
2015), exacerbated emotional responses can be expected in
these patients irrespective of the type of situations presented
to elicit displeasure/envy.
The source of displeasure and envy facing moral and
legal situations seems to be different from the source of
displeasure for the purer deservingness situations. For
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moral and legal situations, displeasure and envy are prob-
ably associated to implicit inequity produced by an appar-
ent success that the receptor achieves by avoiding sanctions
in punishable situations. By contrast, for deservingness situ-
ations, the source of displeasure and envy are directly
related to the receptor’s success in obtaining a desirable
outcome. Thus, by exploring those differential dimensions
of moral emotions, we have shown that scenarios featuring
moral, legal, and deservingness situations can trigger differ-
ent processes related to envy. Our design does not allow
clarifying whether the displeasure reported in all envy scen-
arios (including deservingness, moral, and legal situations),
is generated by the degree of desirability of each situation a
priori, or by the third-party outcome described in each
situation. Future studies should explore these questions
and assess to what extent an undesirable situation modu-
lates moral emotions and evokes other emotional
responses.
Structural brain signatures of experi-
encing moral emotions in all subjects
First, through a combined analysis between bvFTD patients
and healthy controls, we aimed to tackle individual differ-
ences in VBM analyses. The VBM analyses in all subjects
showed that global Schadenfreude scores were positively
associated with the volume of the striatum, confirming
functional MRI evidence (Takahashi et al., 2009;
Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). In addition, our analyses
showed that brain signatures of Schadenfreude go beyond
the striatum, as reduced grey matter volume of the bilateral
angular gyrus was negatively associated with the moral and
legal Schadenfreude dimensions. By contrast deservingness
was related with the right caudate and putamen but also
with bilateral precuneus. The angular gyrus has been re-
ported as a crucial area involved in moral judgements
(Moll et al., 2005) and in the processing of third-party
moral and legal judgements (Raine and Yang, 2006). In
addition, regarding to precuneus, previous studies have
associated this area to mentalizing abilities and socially
valued decision-making processes (Bzdok et al., 2012;
Schlaffke et al., 2015; Niemi et al., 2017). The precuneus
has been reported as impaired in bvFTD patients (Ibañez
and Manes, 2012; Devenney et al., 2014; Baez et al.,
2017c). Thus, Schadenfreude would not only involve
reward-related regions, but also more extended networks
indexing moral and legal dimensions of this emotion.
Regarding envy, we provide the first lesion-based evi-
dence of a positive association with the volume of the
right ACC in all subjects, as previously reported with func-
tional MRI (Takahashi et al., 2009; Cikara and Fiske,
2013; Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014). This region is
modulated by threat of self-concept, similar to cognitive
dissonance (Moll et al., 2005), or social pain (similar to
social exclusion) (van Veen et al., 2009). In addition, the
grouped analysis showed an association between bilateral
the parahippocampus and amygdala with the moral and
legal dimensions (deservingness was negatively associated
with the right DLPFC). Both regions (parahippocampus
and amygdala) are engaged in emotional appraisal
(Levenson et al., 2014) and during unfair social compari-
sons (Jankowski and Takahashi, 2014; O’Callaghan et al.,
2016). The amygdala seems to be a critical region for the
early detection of the basic mosaic of moral evaluation [i.e.
intention to harm (Hesse et al., 2016)]. Furthermore, pre-
vious studies have reported abnormal amygdala volume in
subjects who engage in antisocial behaviours (Raine and
Yang, 2006; Yang et al., 2009). In this report, envy
scores were obtained by asking subjects about the level of
displeasure they feel in deservingness, moral, and legal situ-
ations. The positive correlation between the volume of the
amygdala/parahippocampus and scores of envy facing
moral and legal situations fits well with previous studies
reporting associations between the volume of the amyg-
dala/paralimbic cortex and self-reported displeasure in
emotion tasks (Vicario et al., 2017).
Neurocognitive correlates of moral
dimensions in bvFTD
We also analysed results from the bvFTD group alone,
which afforded a lesion model to explore which areas are
critical for the cognitive process targeted in our task. Most
of the brain-behaviour correlations for envy and
Schadenfreude in bvFTD patients remain significant after
covarying for Hayling and RMET scores (Supplementary
Fig. 5 and Supplementary material). These results suggest
that exacerbation in moral emotions in bvFTD is not a
simple manifestation of social and behavioural disturb-
ances, but rather a new expression of the social and affect-
ive deregulation in bvFTD. Moreover, the whole brain
analyses in bvFTD confirmed a similar pattern of associ-
ations plus additional relevant regions (Supplementary
material).
Schadenfreude
In bvFTD patients, the increased experience of
Schadenfreude was associated with reduced volume in the
bilateral angular gyrus and precuneus, and in the right
frontal pole. Furthermore, as in the grouped analyses, we
found a dissociable pattern between Schadenfreude dimen-
sions. Deservingness showed a negative association with
volume of the right DLPFC and the precuneus. These re-
gions subserve social decision-making, moral cognition and
mentalizing skills (Lieberman, 2007) and are disrupted in
bvFTD (Kipps et al., 2009). Thus, higher experience of
Schadenfreude in situations of deservingness would be
related to disrupted social decision-making and moral-
mediated behaviours.
Higher scores for the moral dimension were associated
with a volume reduction of the bilateral angular gyrus, and
the right frontal pole, while increased legal scores were
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associated with reduced volume of the bilateral angular
gyrus, the right precuneus and the right frontal pole.
These structures are activated during processing of emo-
tionally salient stimuli and moral judgements (Moll et al.,
2005), and are related to social cognition impairments in
bvFTD (Bertoux et al., 2012; Ibañez and Manes, 2012;
Couto et al., 2013; Bertoux et al., 2014; Baez et al.,
2016a). In fact Schadenfreude implies implicit self-other
comparison of mental states (Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2007). In bvFTD, an impaired long-term self-other’s per-
spective integration is observed (Melloni et al., 2016).
Accordingly, higher Schadenfreude scores in patients with
atrophy in those social cognition regions support the gap
between Schadenfreude and mentalizing skills (this inter-
pretation is also supported by the negative correlation
found between Schadenfreude and theory of mind).
Envy
BvFTD patients presented a negative association between
envy and bilateral precuneus. In addition, a dissociable
brain pattern was found between envy dimensions in this
group. Scores for envy situations dominated by deserving-
ness score (as in the case of Schadenfreude) were negatively
associated with the DLPFC, further supporting the conver-
ging role of this area in high level social cognition in
bvFTD. The envy elicited in the moral dimension in
bvFTD patients was associated with volume reduction the
precuneus, a region related to the interplay between men-
talizing abilities and social decision-making (Bzdok et al.,
2012), and affected in bvFTD (Ibañez and Manes, 2012).
Feelings of envy associated with mentalizing involve precu-
neus engagement for immoral and illegal scenarios
(Yamada et al., 2012; Baez et al., 2016a). Finally, scores
for the legal dimension of envy were negatively associated
with volume in the right VMPFC and the right precuneus.
The VMPFC is engaged in scenarios with possible negative
social consequences (Moll et al., 2005; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2007). Arguably, reduced volume of this area in
bvFTD may be associated to high scores for legal contexts,
as these kinds of situations arguably recruit more emotional
and cognitive resources.
The relevance of studying moral
dimensions in bvFTD
Most of the reported anatomical pathways of
Schadenfreude (ventral striatum, DLPFC, and frontal
pole), and envy (ACC, prefrontal cortex, the parahippo-
campus, and the amygdala) correspond to targets of atro-
phy in bvFTD, namely, fronto-temporal (Piguet et al.,
2011; Tosun et al., 2012; Sedeno et al., 2016) and striatal
regions (Pan et al., 2012; Bertoux et al., 2015). Also, other
relevant structures, such as the posterior cingulate cortex,
medial temporal lobe, and parietal regions, has been asso-
ciated with this condition (Supplementary material).
Our results pave the way for comprehending the inter-
play between more complex and ecological emotions and
other cognitive processes affected in bvFTD. First, the in-
crease in moral emotions, also considered as counter-em-
pathy emotions, aligns with previous studies showing
disruptions in social and morally determined behaviours,
such as impairments in affective sharing (Eslinger et al.,
2011a; Kumfor et al., 2013; Baez et al., 2014c, 2016b;
Melloni et al., 2014; Kamminga et al., 2015; Sturm
et al., 2015; Van den Stock et al., 2015; Hutchings et al.,
2017), alterations in perspective taking and the more cog-
nitive sides of empathy (Baez et al., 2014c, 2016b;
Dermody et al., 2016; Ibanez et al., 2016; O’Callaghan
et al., 2016; Ibanez et al., 2017; O’Callaghan and
Hornberger, 2017), and diminished motivation for proso-
cial behaviours (Moll et al., 2011; O’Callaghan et al.,
2016), alongside of a disruption in processing moral judge-
ments (Baez et al., 2014a, 2016a) and an increase in im-
moral and illegal behaviours (de Oliveira-Souza et al.,
2008; Mendez, 2010; Liljegren et al., 2015). The impaired
moral emotions in bvFTD observed in the present results
can be related to affective deregulation; to the relationship
between basic emotion impairments and moral cognition;
or to behavioural disturbances in these patients
(Supplementary material).
Moreover, recent studies on bvFTD have shown that pa-
tients exhibit deficits in integrating self-perspectives with
those of others and rewarding benefits (Melloni et al.,
2016; O’Callaghan et al., 2016; Ibanez et al., 2017).
These impairments are associated with impairments in fron-
totemporal structures. The integration of self-preferences
with the outcomes of another person seems to be a crucial
aspect of the Schadenfreude and envy (Jankowski and
Takahashi, 2014; Fontenelle et al., 2015). Deficits in assess-
ing self and other perspectives in bvFTD might abnormally
enhance moral emotions irrespective of their positive/pleas-
ant valence (as in the case of Schadenfreude) or negative
displeasing valence (as in the case of envy).
Previous authors have suggested that although compli-
ance with basic social norms can be maintained in
bvFTD, more complex normative behaviours (prosociality
or behaviour modulation in function of social information)
that require integration of social contextual information are
usually disrupted in this condition (O’Callaghan et al.,
2016; Baez et al., 2017a). Thus, higher emotional scores
for both Schadenfreude and envy seen in bvFTD patients
could be related to impulsive behaviours, such that patients
fail to integrate the implicit social information present in
emotional situations with different social normative
challenges.
Nonetheless, our results suggest that the exacerbation in
moral emotions in all categories in bvFTD is not fully ex-
plained by social cognitive and executive deficits. In fact,
responses in moral emotions in bvFTD patients remain pre-
served after controlling for inhibitory (Hayling test) and
social cognitive measures (RMET). The exacerbation of
moral emotions in bvFTD seems to be a partially
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independent and new hallmark of the disruption of social,
behavioural, and affective processes in bvFTD.
Taken together, the above alterations seem related to def-
icits in the integration of social contextual information seen
in bvFTD, arguably due to deficits in the frontal-temporo-
insular network (Ibañez and Manes, 2012; Baez et al.,
2017a). The bvFTD emerges as a relevant lesion model
tapping into the ‘mystery of frontal lobes’ (Burgess et al.,
2009): patients provide accurate responses to abstract, iso-
lated and decontextualized cognitive tasks, but they typic-
ally fail in more ecological paradigms demanding a
combination of cognitive, affective, and social processes
(Ibañez and Manes, 2012; Melloni et al., 2014; Baez
et al., 2017a). Such social contextual deficits would lie at
the core of the behavioural, socio-moral, and emotional
impairments observed in bvFTD. Future studies should fur-
ther explore the links between specific compromise of the
social context network and moral emotions.
Limitations and further assessments
Our study has some limitations. First, diagnosis in our pa-
tient sample was based on established clinical assessments,
but it lacked pathological confirmation. However, such
confirmation is not required for diagnosis at the probable
level, as shown in several studies (Rascovsky et al., 2011;
Chiong et al., 2016; Garcı́a-Cordero et al., 2016; Melloni
et al., 2016; Sedeno et al., 2016; Ahmed et al., 2017).
Moreover, we have followed international standards
(Knopman and Roberts, 2011; Piguet et al., 2011;
Rascovsky et al., 2011), as diagnosis was performed in a
memory clinic after deliberative consensus by a highly
experienced group composed of geriatricians, neurologists,
neuropsychologists, and psychiatrists (Baez et al., 2014a,
2016b; Garcı́a-Cordero et al., 2016; Melloni et al., 2016;
Sedeno et al., 2017). In particular, all diagnoses were per-
formed following criteria by (Rascovsky et al., 2011), for
probable bvFTD patients, and international criteria
(McKhann et al., 2011), for patients with Alzheimer’s
disease.
Second, our approach did not allow us to assess the re-
lationship between envy and Schadenfreude dimensions
with other cognitive processes, including reward processing,
and other social cognitive processes such as emotional shar-
ing (e.g. empathy). Further studies should explore the par-
ticular relationship between dimensions of moral emotions
and their relationship with cognitive processes including
social reward and socio-cognitive skills (including perspec-
tive taking and affective sharing), moral judgement, and
cognitive control among other processes.
Third, we compared the behavioural responses of bvFTD
patients to moral emotions relative to those of a contrastive
lesion model (Alzheimer’s disease), to control for task com-
prehension problems associated with neurodegeneration.
Future studies should explore the brain correlates of process-
ing those emotions in Alzheimer’s disease (as well as other
neurodegenerative conditions) to fully comprehend the role of
other brain areas usually impaired across neurodegenerative
conditions. Although our study did not include VBM analysis
of patients with Alzheimer’s disease, several reasons attest to
the validity of the neurocognitive pattern observed in bvFTD
(Supplementary material). Despite these considerations, future
studies should evaluate the degree of atrophy specificity by
comparing bvFTD with other conditions, such as Alzheimer’s
disease, other forms of FTD, and Huntington’s disease
(another neurodegenerative condition associated with moral
emotion impairments (Baez et al., 2017d).
Finally, we only found correlations between global scores
of moral emotions and measures tracking social, cognitive,
and behavioural impairments in bvFTD. Since this relation-
ship was only reported with global scores, we do not know
to what extent performance on each sub-dimension of envy
and Schadenfreude is related to other cognitive and behav-
ioural dimensions in bvFTD. Further studies should explore
the extent to which the deservingness and moral-legal di-
mensions are related to specific cognitive and behavioural
processes. The relationship between recognition and third-
party evaluation of moral and legal situations and social
cognitive processes (including empathy, emotion percep-
tion, and social decision-making) represents a promising
avenue for future research.
Conclusions
Classical theoretical approaches have hinted at the multidi-
mensional nature to the moral emotions of envy and
Schadenfreude. Those earlier theories suggested that
moral emotions are complex cognitive and affective states
that, depending on the circumstances, may be considered
the worst evil emotions (Schopenhauer 1788–1860) or, al-
ternatively, good-natured emotions based on principles of
fairness (Nietzsche 1844–1900). Together, our results pro-
vide unprecedented evidence of an exacerbated experience
of moral emotions in bvFTD, while reinforcing the multi-
dimensional nature of envy and Schadenfreude. Our results
highlight the importance of analysing new and more eco-
logical moral emotions in this population, with a view to
examining relevant interactions between cognitive, moral,
and emotional processes. In addition, our study reveals a
new behavioural profile in bvFTD, which may help clin-
icians identify patients with neurocognitive disorders with
mixed cognitive and behavioural alterations.
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